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The three largest mutual fund providers—Vanguard, BlackRock, and StateStreet—now manage 
more than $15 trillion. It is an amount equivalent to one-third of the United States’ GDP. 82 
percent of all assets flowing into all investment funds, both active and passive, over the last 
decade have gone to the “Big Three.” For the first time in 2019, passive inflows surpassed 
those of active. 
1
Throughout history, the mutual fund and the index fund have been thought of as benign, or 
better yet, that they are the most reliable ways to obtain market returns. They are the bastion of 
the individual investor. It is true that the diversification and low fees of mutual funds has greatly 
expanded access to the markets without requiring high levels of risk. By some estimations, 
index funds allow investors to get the same access to the markets as any other vehicle for a 
tenth of the cost. 
2
However, has anyone considered the downsides? Do capital markets facilitate the efficient 
allocation of capital if half of participants are agnostic to fundamentals? This paper examines 
how the mutual fund and index fund have grown so large, and what the prevalence of passive 
strategies means for capital markets and corporate governance.

The Ups And Downs of Corporate Governance and Capital Markets 
It’s easy to bash Wall Street. It unites a lot of people. However, the way that the market 
currently operates has been pushed as the only way markets can function. Today, you hear a 
lot of about securitization. Everything has a price. LinkedIn premium? People buy things that 
have doubtful value, like non-fungible tokens. Wall Street banks get rich by buying and selling 
securities ten milliseconds quicker than someone else. It’s funny to think that most transactions 
are on the secondary market, meaning no new capital is actually going to businesses. We 
should recall, however, that the origins of this system were courageous and innovative 
campaigns to make the world a better place.
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The inventor of value investing was Benjamin Graham. He’s the one who taught Warren Buffett 
how to invest. The year was 1926 and the stock market was not much different than a betting 
pool. The notion of “intrinsic value” was non-existent, and so was the notion that companies 
were supposed to maximize investor returns. Graham set his eyes on Northern Pipeline, one of 
the eight companies spun out of John Rockefeller’s Standard Oil. This was before the SEC 
required public companies to file regular financial reports. However, the Interstate of 
Commerce Commission collected detailed information about the railroads. The only guy on 
Wall Street to realize that was Benjamin Graham. Not surprisingly, he found that there was still 
a high degree of cross-ownership among the railroads. More importantly, he struck gold: 
Northern Pipeline was hiding millions of dollars worth of securities and railroad bonds from its 
shareholders. Graham would then wager one of the first major activism fights in history. He 
believed that Northern Pipeline could distribute as much as $90 worth of dividends per share 
and still be a healthy, debt-free company. That was money that investors could allocate else 
where. And not to mention, Norther Pipeline was taxed on its interest income. Graham was 
able to get a meeting with the financial advisor to the Rockefeller Foundation. The advisor 
explained that the foundation didn’t interfere with its holdings’ business practices, so Graham 
then went around and convinced as many shareholders as he could to vote for his board 
replacements. By 1927, he succeeded. Graham was on the board, and the board quickly 
approved a dividend.  A new era of corporate governance—one that put shareholders ahead of 3
lackluster managers—began. Similarly, this campaign engendered a new era of corporate 
transparency and financially sound valuations that would make the market more efficient.

“WARNING: If any banker, lawyer, shipper, supplier or other person solicits your proxy for the 
present Board, ask him what his special interests are, or what your Company is paying for his 
services. Like the bankers now on your Board, he, too, may be hoping to receive special favors from 
your railroad or from the bankers”  4
—Robert Young in a newspaper ad for his proxy campaign against the board of New York Central 
A decade later, Robert Young, the “Populist of Wall Street,” took on another railroad company, 
New York Central. He pioneered the use of newspaper ads for his campaign. This appealed to 
the employees of New York Central who owned shares through the employee stock purchase 
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plan. Although he was fighting for financial restructuring and for routes that would make 
traveling easier and cheaper for consumers, his campaign was mostly a repudiation of an 
entrenched management team that was in cahoots with bankers and didn’t properly attend to 
the company. His slate of directors included businessmen, a retired employee, and a woman. 
To understand how out of touch the New York Central’s board was, here is what the chairman 
put out in a written newspaper ad: “You do not learn railroading relaxing at Palm Beach, 
Newport and other resorts at which Mr. Young spends the greater part of his time. I know, 
because in recent years, I have spent a good deal of my time engaged in more or less similar 
pursuits. But then, I do not aspire to be chief executive officer of the New York Central.“  Young 5
gained control of the company.

Many others have since ridden the gravy train of shareholder activism. Activism was used for 
good against the railroads, but it has also been used for bad. Corporate takeovers were a 
game that caused massive layoffs. Some activists felt that because at one particular time, a 
company might be worth more dead than alive, they should liquidate it. Gone are the virtues of 
resilience or nurturing. Paul Singer’s Elliot Management was responsible for the merger of 
Cabelas and Bass Pro Shops in 2019, which erased 2,000 jobs from the 6,500 person town of 
Sidney, Nebraska, plummeting housing prices.  This version of shareholder primacy angers 6
both Tucker Carlson and Elizabeth Warren.  While it seemed just that shareholders should 7
deserve the profits of the company they own and that management teams should be held 
accountable, shareholder primacy also jettisoned corporate culture that put employees and 
communities first.

The moral of these stories is that there have always been conflicts in capital markets and 
corporate governance, and there always will be. The good guy can become the bad guy 
decades later. The story of activism is fun. Each activist was a colorful figure, usually with 
something to prove. Benjamin Graham was overflowing with wisdom. Robert Young had a 
populist bluster. Ross Perot, after being bought out of General Motors, would go on to receive 
the most votes (19 percent) an independent presidential candidate has ever garnered. Karla 
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Scherer waged one of the weirdest corporate battles of all time against her ex-husband. John 
Bogle, however, was boring. He talked about the individual investor and the soul of capitalism. 
The index fund was called the pursuit of meritocracy, and has been referred to as the couch 
potato portfolio. Bogle was a frugal, hard-working man who took home a $100,000 salary that 
was dwarfed by those of most major financial figures. But today we find ourselves in a position 
where index funds own half of the public market and are only set to grow larger.  Some would 8
say we have entered a new era of Robber Barons or a Gilded Age. The market distortions 
created by indexing strategies, the absolute failure of mutual funds to be good stewards of 
capital, and the cartel-like incentives common owners potentially create should make us 
question the merits of mutual funds as they stand.

John “Jack” Bogle 
“If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done the most for 
American investors, the hands down choice should be Jack Bogle.”  9
—Warren Buffett 
John Bogle grew up in New Jersey. He was from a middle class family that suffered from the 
1929 crash. Bogle started working various jobs at age 10 to support his family, instilling a 
strong work ethic and frugality that stayed with him his whole life. Even after leaving Vanguard, 
he continued to write speeches and books despite a long history of heart troubles and a 
surgery. He graduated cum laude from Blair Academy, a boarding school in New Jersey. He 
then made it to Princeton on a generous scholarship. In his senior thesis, he presciently wrote 
about the economic role of the mutual fund, at a time when they were almost non-existent.  10
The progenitor of the mutual fund was the Alexander Fund, started by Wallace Alexander in 
1907. But in 1951, when Bogle wrote his thesis, the mutual fund industry had 51 million 
shareholders and managed $3 billion in assets, which accounted for 1.5 percent of total 
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savings.  His thesis easily landed him a job at Wellington Management Company, the fourth 11
largest mutual fund at the time. 
12
Like Benjamin Graham, Bogle also believed that the world of finance needed reform from the 
inside (Bogle later wrote New Perspectives for An Intelligent Investor, an allusion to Graham’s 
famous book, Intelligent Investor ). But instead of trying to hold management teams 13
accountable, Bogle sought to expand access to the markets. He wanted to “democratize” 
investing. Wellington Management Company was a good place to start. It had grown strongly 
after the 1929 crash, since it had a conservative reputation. Wellington didn’t borrow against its 
assets, and invested in more bonds than other providers. 
14
Although they were called “mutual” funds, that’s not exactly what they were. The first open-end 
mutual fund, the Massachusetts Investors Trust, was a true mutual fund: owned by the 
shareholders.  In 1958, however, a fiduciary rule allowed fund companies to sell their 15
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Source: John Bogle. Stay The Course: The Story of Vanguard and the Index Revolution. Wiley. 2019. Page 35
management contracts to outside investors.  Subsequently, the vast majority of mutual funds 16
had two boards: one for the funds, and one to manage the funds, called a management 
company. The management company would oversee administrative tasks, like distribution and 
advisory services. But profits that flowed to the management company necessarily were 
deducted from the fund shareholders. Fighting this, in addition to pushing low costs, would 
define Bogle’s momentous impact on the investing world.

Bogle became CEO of Wellington Management in 1967, after a merger with a go-go fund from 
Boston.  The merger was contrary to the conservative investing approach Bogle was used to, 17
but Bogle knew his “bagel shop” wouldn’t stand a chance against the “doughnut shops” (such 
as Fidelity), so he proposed the acquisition.  He soon became sickened by the Boston group’s 18
equity flush strategies and loyalty to institutional investors. Bogle sought to reel in the 
company, and address the common investor. In a January 1974 memo that he presented to the 
management board, Bogle proposed that the Wellington funds, owned by the shareholders, 
acquire the Wellington Management company. He calculated that there would be $2 million in 
savings, a 40 percent cost reduction. The proposal fell on deaf ears, and, amid a broader 
disagreement, the Wellington Management board voted 10-1 to fire Bogle (he recused himself 
from the vote).  “Fired with enthusiasm,” Bogle rallied the fund managers to vote for his 19
mutualization proposal.  On June 20, 1974, the fund managers, to the board’s surprise, voted 20
for a mutualization structure. Wellington Management accepted but retained distribution and 
advisory functions. The funds themselves would have to take on the legal compliance tasks, all 
financial accounting, and the role of ensuring that the funds’ prices reached the newspapers.  
21
Bogle created the Vanguard Group Inc. on September 24, 1974, a company owned by each of 
the 11 Wellington funds’ 380,000 shareholders that would provide the administrative services 
to each fund manager. It would operate at cost and would not take home profits. Any leftover 
reserves would be returned to the fund shareholders. Serving as the President and CEO of 
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Vanguard, Bogle continued taking the same salary as he had before, a relatively small, fixed 
payment of $100,000. 
22
Bogle was now finally able to focus solely on the client: by reducing management fees. At the 
time (1975), the expense ratio was around 0.89 percent.  From 1981 to 1995, Bogle cut annual 23
portfolio advisory costs from 0.2 percent, to 0.1 percent in 1995, saving shareholders $85 
million annually. This didn’t happen without backlash. A senior executive at a competing mutual 
fund told Bogle, “By giving the client a fair shake, you’re going to destroy this industry.” Bogle 
was reassured he was doing something right.  In contrast to today’s myopic profit-maximizing 24
norm, pursuing mutualization seems regressive. Indeed, when the New York Stock Exchange 
repealed the ban on banks going public in 1970, not surprisingly, they started to abandon their 
partnership structure and went public. 
25
In 1993, Bogle authored Bogle on Mutual Funds, a guide for new investors and a call for 
improvement in the industry. He wrote, “This industry can have lower costs for customers, 
create much better disclosure, have honest advertising, and be overseen by more responsible 
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directors.“  This echoed his shareholder letters and meetings with the press. In 1991, Bogle 26
delivered a speech called “Losing Our Way: Where Are The Independent Directors?” He 
criticized mutual funds that had increased their fees, despite increased economies of scale and 
the use of existing shareholder capital to subsidize gaining new shareholders.  He even 27
angered the lobbying arm of the mutual fund industry, the Investment Company Institute. 
Listeners to his speeches called him a communist and a Marxist. Bogle replied, “In the office, I 
am often called a fascist.”  After his forceful retirement due to age, Bogle continued the fight 28
for the common investor, testifying in front of Congress for measures such as a fiduciary 
standard that would give mutual fund shareholders primacy over management boards.  Bogle 29
was the real deal.

To the everyday investor, the advent of the mutual fund sure felt like a “democratization” of 
investing. The mutual fund revolution ran parallel to the increased access to financial tools by 
the middle class. Through innovations like credit cards, IRAs and the advent of discount 
brokerages like Charles Schwab and TD Ameritrade, the middle class joined the money class.  30
By the end of the 1990s, ABC’s Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? had become the signature 
show of the era. Baby Boomers fantasized about retiring at 50. And ominously, Gen X-er’s 
came up with their own vision of the American dream: wealth without working.  In 1983, only 31
15.9 percent of American households owned stocks. By 2000, 50 percent did. Most of that 
exposure came through 401(k) plans via stock mutual funds.  Vanguard’s assets grew from 32
$2.4 billion in 1980 to $540 billion by the end of 1990.  
33
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American Or Un-American: Index Funds 
Soon after creating Vanguard, Bogle unveiled the first retail index fund in August 1976, named 
the Vanguard First Index Investment Trust (it was later renamed as the Vanguard 500 Index). An 
index fund tracks the market or a sector of the market. Its returns should match the market 
less any frictions, including management fees, transaction costs, and drag. Truth be told, 
Bogle’s main reason for introducing the index fund was to further internalize Vanguard’s 
activities, specifically the advisory function, so as to weaken the grasp of Wellington 
Management. Bogle did, however, believe the product would benefit his shareholders. 
34
In the 1970s, there were generally two schools of index fund proponents, whose ideologies 
would eventually converge. Out of the University of Chicago, the efficient market hypothesis 
laid the framework for creating passive market tracking vehicles. Their belief was that the 
market was an adequate enough mechanism to set proper asset prices. Some took that to 
mean that doing one’s own research on individual companies was basically futile. University of 
Chicago academics were part of the first index fund construction at Wells Fargo, and others 
went on to start Dimensional Fund Advisors, the first real index competitor that Vanguard 
faced.  The other school was based on modern portfolio theory, which came from Harry 35
Markowitz. From him was the theory that investors should consider the risk of their aggregate 
portfolio, rather than the idiosyncratic risks of each stock they owned. This gave rise to 
diversification. Bill Sharpe’s “The Arithmetic of Active Management” took it further. He claimed 
that a passive vehicle that holds the market will match the market. This makes sense, but it 
implies that all active investors constitute the rest of the market. It is then a zero-sum game, or 
in fact a net negative game since active players take higher fees. Therefore, a low-cost 
diversification strategy is superior to any active strategy. Bogle had voiced similar sentiments in 
his 1951 Princeton thesis.  Bogle didn't fully subscribe to the efficient market hypothesis. He 36
instead adhered to his own “cost matters hypothesis.”  However, fundamentalists, such as 37
Bogle, were warm to the EMH. Influenced by Benjamin Graham’s ideas such as “intrinsic 
value,” the hyper-rationality of the EMH was attractive to them. Though, the fundamentalists 
might want to re-read Graham’s chapter titled “The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market 
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Price” in Security Analysis, where he acknowledges that markets are vulnerable to irrational 
human emotion. 
38
Three years before Bogle introduced the Vanguard 500 Index fund, Princeton Professor Burton 
Malkiel published the famous A Random Walk Down Wall Street. The book is still in print today, 
in its 12th edition.  The publication marked a watershed moment in finance, as everyone now 39
understood the EMH. Book quotes like, “A blindfolded chimpanzee throwing darts at the Wall 
Street Journal can select a portfolio that can do just as good as the experts,” gave credence to 
the idea of passive, highly diversified portfolios.  Famed economist Paul Samuelson pleaded 40
for someone to make a retail index fund in an article named “Challenge to Judgement,”  and 41
casted aspersions on active investor’s "Napoleonic delusions of being able to pick winners that 
will quadruple their money.”  Charley Ellis wrote “The Losers Game” (referring to active funds) 42
the following year. These three put Bogle over the edge, and made him a true believer in the 
index fund.  Malkiel and Ellis would join Vanguard’s board. 
43 44
The public’s reaction to Bogle’s release of the index fund was markedly negative. From the 
1960s until the 1970/1974 bear market, anyone wealthy enough to play in the stock market 
was either doing it themselves or paying some gunslinger fund manager.  Market participants 45
were not looking to meet the market, they were looking to beat it! Commentators called the 
index fund “the pursuit of mediocrity.” It was “Un-American” and “a formula for a solid, 
consistent, long-term loser.” 
46
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Expectedly, demand for the product was low. Bogle hoped to start the fund with $150 million 
under management, but only raised $14 million in its first year. But come the 1990s, index 
proponents began to win the ideological argument. Bogle said, “Index funds are a result of 
skepticism that any given financial manager can outperform the market. How can anyone 
possibly pick which stock funds are going to excel over the next 10 years?” From 1985 to 
1999, the Vanguard 500 Index retuned 1,204 percent, compared to 886 percent for the average 
large-cap blend fund. The Vanguard index had $1 billion under management in 1988, $1.8 
billion in 1990, $9.4 billion in 1995, and $107 billion at the end of the dot-com bubble that burst 
in March 2000.  And today, it is common knowledge that the index fund, also known as the 47




Of course, despite the best of intentions, the mutual fund revolution wasn’t what it was reputed 
to be. As a bull market fueled by low interest rates and speculation drove stock prices up, and 
the middle class thought they were finally reaping the benefits of capitalism. As the stock 
market tumbled in March 2000, the everyday investor was left desperate and confused, while 
the mutual funds had taken home stone cold cash.

The 401(k) absolved corporations of guaranteeing retirement payouts. Assets in 401(k)s went 
from $0 in 1980 to $1.7 trillion in 2000. About half of that went to the mutual fund industry, 
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while much of the remainder went into employer’s stock (which was quite unfortunate for Enron 
employees later in 2001).  Mutual funds would set up contracts with corporations, charge 48
advisory fees, and gain their business by voting their shares in the company deferentially. 
Despite Bogle’s low-cost revolution, mutual funds still had higher management fees than 
pension funds, layering on another expense to the American worker. Financial columnist Lewis 
Braham called it a “Herculean” marketing effort—by mutual funds, and the press—to convince 
the public that the shift into investing was fair and that anyone could get rich.  For example, 49
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman described this new era of markets as 
democratic.  Of course, the idea of shareholder democracy is false. One share, one vote 50
means the system is a plutocracy. Your ten shares in Apple won’t grant you influence over Tim 
Cook, and if your money is in a mutual fund, you don’t have the ability to vote your shares 
anyways. The cruel irony is that there is no better alternative to the mutual or index fund. Bogle 
has minted more millionaires than Warren Buffet.  By Vanguard calculations, from its inception 51
in 1974 to 2018, it has saved investors $217 billion, an amount that disqualified many from 
investing in the first place.  In a 2003 study, Burton Malkiel found that actively managed 52
portfolios do not, on average, provide a higher risk-adjusted net return over passively managed 
portfolios on average. 
53
Incentives And Structures 
Mutual funds weren’t the reason that middle class Americans flocked to equities and started 
investing. Mutual funds merely provided an avenue to do so. They benefited greatly from rising 
stocks and capitalized on this by gathering assets. The fact of the matter is that people weren’t 
entering the markets out of desire, but out of necessity.
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First, it must be established that mutual funds don’t particularly care about overvaluations. Yes, 
the industry is filled with Bogle-heads and true believers in making investing affordable. But as 
a business, such funds they structurally work fine with overvaluations. The vast majority of 
mutual funds compensate their fund managers by assets-under-management, not fund 
performance. Mutual funds don’t market their S&P 500 index, they market their low costs or 
their niche offerings, like BlackRock’s iShares MSCI USA Min Vol Factor ETF. The business 
strategy is largely economies of scale. The managerial incentive is to build an empire. Any 
sustained overvaluations in the market increase manager compensation. Clearly, offering a 3x 
Leveraged Bullish S&P 500 ETF and a 3x Leveraged Bearish S&P 500 ETF means you don’t 
care how appropriate valuations are.

Today, indexes make up about 80 percent of the mutual fund industry. Back in the time frame 
of 1995, they accounted for about 5 percent of the industry.  For an index fund, the business 54
operation is simple: customer puts cash in, buy; customer wants to cash out, sell. There is 
never any consideration of the underlying fundamentals. This problem exacerbated the dot-
com bubble, and we are experiencing it again today. 
55
One of the biggest beneficiaries of the bull market could arguably be the mutual funds, as they 
were the intermediaries between investors and their money. They would collect their 
management fees whether the stock market went up or down. It is just like an investment bank 
collecting fees on a merger. As long as the deal is done, do they really care if synergies 
materialize?

Another component that laid the foundation for the growth of the mutual fund was the 401(k). 
Its birth, on January 1, 1980, was a melancholy day for the American worker.  It had humble 56
beginnings, invented by consultant Ted Benna who wanted to provide more retirement benefits 
to his clients’ employees.  Soon after, the IRS proposed formal rules for 401(k)s to address 57
inefficient tax rules in defined benefit plans. Managers liked the idea, since they likely stepped 
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into their role with large accumulated benefit obligations. Previous managers deferred promises 
of swaths of wealth to their successors. Not to mention, people were giving up smoking and 
turning to healthier foods.  The 401(k) gave the corporation a way minimize its future debts. 58
Mutual funds capitalized on this and started making relationships with the companies, showing 
off their menus of funds. They were competing with pension fund managers.

The mostly bullish market of 1982 to 1999 laid the foundation—it was proof of concept—for 
the passive fund. The underlying mechanisms, from investment strategy to central bank policy, 
still remain today. It is a useful exercise to look at the influences and reactions to all that 
occurred.

Alan Greenspan’s New Economy 
The term central banker is a misnomer. The bureaucrats at the Fed don’t engage in activities 
that are similar to a commercial bank or investment bank. They are central planners. The 
Federal Reserve enforces banking regulations and standardizes the currency, but its main job is 
to pick an interest rate to within two decimal places that is the “right one.” It’s also an agency 
shrouded in secrecy. The Fed only releases FMOC meeting minutes five years after their 
occurrence. What Greenspan said in those meetings in the 1990s counter what he said in 
public.  Texas Representative Ron Paul recalls that Greenspan would limit the number of 59
Congress members he would take questions from in committee hearings. They’d have to wait 
months to get to him.  In the meetings Paul was able get with Greenspan, Paul would plead 60
with him to stop slashing rates, in disbelief that Greenspan once shared his libertarian 
aspiration of returning to a gold standard. 
61
Come the election of Reagan in 1980, Americans were hopeful for economic recovery from the 
recession. They were desperate for work.  Under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, interest rates as 62
high as 16 percent, and unemployment also high. Unemployment finally reduced labor costs, 
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and in August 1982, Volcker declared that he would cut rates. And as a result, the bull market 
began. 
63
"It is hard to imagine a more stupid or more dangerous way of making decisions than by putting 
those decisions in the hands of people who pay no price for being wrong.” 
—Thomas Sowell 
Before the 1970s, the Fed had the view that they could manage demand by increasing taxes 
and increasing spending to keep unemployment low and keep the economy going. Its goal was 
to fight inflation. In the 1970s, many of the Neo-Keynesian relationships started to break down. 
The Phillips curve, which was supposed to govern the relationship between inflation and 
unemployment, was rendered useless as the economy achieved low inflation and 
unemployment at the same time. Greenspan then decided to not manage inflation, but rather 
manage asset price expectations. The prevailing view was that the Fed should raise interest 
rates (“take away the punch bowl”) to suppress speculation. However, Greenspan ignored that 
wisdom.  Every time financial conditions tightened, he cut rates to facilitate borrowing and 64
lending to keep the market up. This experiment started in 1989, two years into his role as 
Chairman.  It was clear Greenspan’s main interest was protecting his Wall Street buddies: he 65
also cut rates when financial conditions were objectively improving or clearly frothy. 
66
Wall Street loves rate cuts. Ignoring the long-term consequences, rate cuts appreciate the 
value of old bonds. And as new bond yields decline, equities look more attractive. With lower 
returns from saving cash, people are inclined to spend or invest in riskier assets. Meanwhile, 
investment banks rack up fees underwriting debt for companies that want to borrow on the 
cheap. As stated in the above section, mutual funds can be lumped in with Wall Street here.

 Lewis Braham. The House That Bogle Built. McGraw-Hill. 2011. Chapter 1063
 Mike Green on Valuetainment Economics podcast. “The Rise & Fall of Passive Investing.” 64
November 13, 2020. Accessible at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JUEC93O8A4
 Mike Green on Valuetainment Economics podcast. “The Rise & Fall of Passive Investing.” 65
November 13, 2020. Accessible at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JUEC93O8A4
 William Fleckenstein. Greenspan's Bubbles: The Age Of Ignorance At The Fed. McGraw-Hill. 66
2008. Chapter 3
16
“If Wall Street had a chisel, Alan Greenspan’s smiling face would today be carved on Mount 
Rushmore.”  67
—Bill Fleckenstein, a hedge fund manager who ran a short-only fund that rode some dot-com 
stocks down to zero 
Greenspan was spineless and unscrupulous. He bent to the commentators and politicians of 
both sides. He was a man whose economics rabbi, Arthur Burns, was a Republican career 
bureaucrat,  yet whose social circle included the zealous Ayn Rand, the novelist who started 68
objectivism, an ideology that promotes ruthless self-interest to the point of denouncing 
charity.  His influencers might explain his actions. In the words of journalist Matt Taibbi, the 69
American system “preaches sink-or-swim laissez-faire capitalism to most but acts as a highly 
interventionist, bureaucratic welfare state for a select few.” 
70
In 1984, Greenspan wrote to a concerned Ed Gray, who was then the Federal Home Loan Bank 
board chairman, saying that the deregulation of the savings and loans (S&Ls) practices of thrift 
enterprises was working as planned. He mentioned 17 thrifts he thought were sound, and said 
that the management team of the Keating thrift enterprise Lincoln Savings and Loan, who he 
was currently doing a consulting job for, was a good example. Four years later, 15 of the 17 
enterprises he mentioned were out of business. Lincoln Savings and Loan was seized by 
Federal regulators in 1989, costing taxpayers $2.5 billion.  Overall, the taxpayer would be 71
footing $132.1 billion in bailouts for S&L companies. 
72
To address this, Greenspan began easing monetary conditions in 1989.  But, other players 
associated with the S&L thrifts were suffering: the issuers of the junk bonds were starting to 
default. In particular, Citi bank’s stock hit an 11-year low. The Fed axed the federal funds rate 
from 4.5 percent to 3.5 percent. Borrowing at short-term rates and loaning at long-term rates, 
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Citi was given considerable breathing room.  And just like that, the “Greenspan Put” was 73
invented. In May 1989, the federal funds rate was 9 percent. By July 1991, it was 5.75 percent. 
He then cut the rate down to 3 percent by September 1992, and held the historically low rate 
for fifteen more months.  
74
It was clear that the Fed’s express purpose was to be a backstop for Wall Street. Many later 
examples, like the bail out of Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, support this view. 
As a result, all of Wall Street, and those with exposure, had immense, unbridled market 
confidence. Every time a crisis occurred, even idiosyncratically, such as in the case of LTCM, 
the Fed would be there to inject liquidity.

To anyone preserving their money, the effect of lower interest rates mean savings in a banks 
can’t provide enough yield. The short-term interest rate of 4 percent percent in 1991 was the 
lowest it had been in 27 years.  Equities, therefore, were the only viable option. The key is not 75
that the people were capitalizing on low interest rates, they were putting money into equities 
because they had to.

The share of households with stock (indirectly or directly) went from 19 percent in 1983 to 49 
percent in 1999.  As interest rates moved to lows unimaginable, people, comprised mainly of 76
Baby Boomers, flocked to equities, mostly through mutual funds. Previously used to 15 
percent yields, the regular person was yearning for a mere 8 percent. In the summer of 1992, 1 
in 10 mutual fund shareholders were new customers. 75 percent of the novices went into 
equity funds.  Many likely didn’t even know that their principal was at risk. The makeup of the 77
stock market had changed. Those with incomes lower than $250,000 increased their share of 
ownership of the market from 24 percent in 1983 to 43 percent by 1992. 
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While Greenspan forced unwilling and naive investors into the market, he also channelled his 
Randianism, telling those who knew how to play the game to play. This is the era when Oliver 
Stone’s Gordon Gekko, based on Ivan Boesky, immortalized the phrase “greed is good.”

There’s no other good explanation other than interest rates for the increase in stock ownership. 
There was no bottoms-up cultural revolution that made everyday people want to invest in 
equities. The academic developments in finance that may have made investing in equities a 
pragmatic choice such as modern portfolio theory, weren’t strong enough either. Those 
developments mostly occurred back in the 1960s. In fact, before the nineties, main street 
America wasn’t too fond of Wall Street. Insider trading scandals in Lower Manhattan and job 
destroying corporate takeovers gave Wall Street a bad name.  Some financiers, like Michael 79
Milken, were sent to jail. 
80
Come the recession of 1991, the middle class’ psychology changed. Due to the decline in the 
housing market (some areas’ values decreased by a third ) and stagnant wages,  people 81 82
were looking for a way to score. In 1995, more citizens visited casinos than theme parks.  83
Reports from financial institutions permeated the psyche. A Merrill Lynch report from 1994 
read, assuming “even moderate cuts in future Social Security benefits…the baby boomers may 
be saving less than one-tenth of what is required for a secure retirement.”  (This was despite a 84
regressive Social Security tax hike that Greenspan proposed to Reagan. ) People didn’t have 85
more money to save. So they bought into the market. The only caveat was that those few who 
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did have excess capital, turned to consumption instead of investing as the greed era began.  86
By 1992, Americans with incomes under $75,000 owned 42 percent of all publicly traded 
stocks. 
87
Financial journalist Maggie Mahar points out that this monumental effort by the press and the 
financial community—mutual funds included—to get Americans into stock and bond funds 
may have carried out on false premises. A 37 year-old putting just $60,000 into a risk-free-30-
year Treasury bond in 1992 would grow to $500,000 by the time they were 67.  Studies such 88
as Bessembinder (2018) show that only four percent of stocks since 1926 have outperformed 
T-bills.  Investors, however, were being told that equity had a premium. The equity premium in 89
the Capital Asset Pricing Model outright assumes outright that any equity has a higher 
expected return over a risk-free asset.

The average 401(k) or IRA investor didn’t care about P/E ratios. Mutual funds, like Vanguard led 
by St. Jack, bridged the knowledge gap. Soon, America became obsessed with the market. 
Mutual funds would buy the hottest stocks, and people would buy the hottest funds.

Soon, Greenspan actually got the message. As early as 1994, Greenspan thought there was a 
bubble. In February of 1994, he raised rates by a modest one percent, the first time he had 
raised rates in five years. The transcript of the secret April 18, 1994 FMOC meeting indicated 
that Greenspan noted that the rate increases “defused a significant part of the bubble which 
had previously built up.”  In another FMOC meeting the following month, he slightly shifted his 90
view, saying “I think there’s still a lot of bubble around.” In May, he hiked rates by one half a 
percentage point. He continued modestly hiking the rates until February 1995, which then 
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stood at 6 percent.  Then, unprovoked, in July of 1995, he started cutting rates again, even 91
though the market was 20 percent higher than when he identified the bubble at the start of the 
prior year. By the end of 1995, once the market was 35 percent higher than when he uttered 
the word, he made no mention of a bubble in FMOC meetings or in public. In 1995, the real bull 
market took the reins.

Greenspan invoked the efficient market hypothesis, and effectively worked backwards. Under 
the EMH, if stocks are high, there must be real economic growth, he argued. He came up with 
the idea of a “New Economy,” theorizing that high-flying technology stocks were proof that 
monumental changes in technology and productivity were occurring, and also that those 
effects led to an overstatement of inflation. Greenspan argued that in a  world increasingly 
dependent on software, “intellectual services,” like certain R&D expenditures should be 
capitalized.

In line with Greenspan, the fiction writers at the Bureau of Labor Statistics massaged the CPI 
calculations to make the inflation rate appear smaller. Some of the changes were humorous, 
such as “hedonic adjustments,” whereby increases in the price of products had to be offset by 
their increase in quality. Hedonic adjustments meant that features, like airbags on a car, would 
reduce the cost of the car in the CPI calculations, even though air bags cost consumers more. 
It also allowed for considerable discretion in valuing quality changes. The price of a car in the 
United States increased 308 percent from 1979 to 2004, yet the BLS calculated that it had only 
increased by 71 percent. Congress believed these numbers and offloaded reserves for Social 
Security benefits. Social Security payments are also not adjusted for inflation. Anyone receiving 
Social Security benefits or holding an inflation-indexed bond (e.g. TIPS) was impacted directly.

Mutual funds also rode the imaginary wave. They had bought the “New Economy” illusion, as 
many had. A 1996 Lou Harris poll showed that 56 percent of mutual fund advisors believed the 
stock market would keep rising for the next 10 years. Never mind the remarkable 14 percent 
annual returns of the preceding decade. 29 percent of the respondents actually believed the 
market would return more than 14 percent.  
92
Prodded by mutual fund pitchmen, who purported that American exceptionalism would 
practically guarantee 11 percent annual returns, Americans piled on into mutual funds, mostly 
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through their 401(k)s.  By 1998, three quarters of corporate retirement plans were in 401(k)s.  93 94
People were picking the funds they invested in. Soon, the American people espoused the 
Greenspan ideology themselves.  With rates at historic lows, they needed to believe 95
Greenspan. Artifacts like Bogle’s Common Sense on Mutual Funds had people thinking that 
they had the wherewithal become great capitalists. CNBC started reporting “real time” 
updates, driving speculation. 
96
At this point, it is crucial to come back to the mutual and index fund strategy. Checks were 
flying into mutual fund offices. Were they to tell their customers that stocks were overvalued? 
No, their algorithm is cash in, buy more, regardless of price. This is easy to see with index 
funds. For actively managed mutual funds, cash was flying in so fast that managers just put 
their money into blue chips or otherwise large, highly liquid, or popular stocks  in what 97
became known as the second “Nifty Fifty.”  This doesn’t look like what a fiduciary is supposed 98
to do. That mutual funds are asset gathering machines became apparent. Again, mutual fund 
managers are compensated by assets under management, not performance. The business 
model of a mutual fund is to spread fees across more assets. Far from providing safe funds, 
mutual funds started marketing highly specialized funds, like the Vanguard Ohio Long-Term Tax 
Exempt Fund. Yes, even the conservative Vanguard couldn’t resist. Since the beginning of the 
bull market, Vanguard added 82 new funds, totaling 103 in March 2000.  By 1996, there were 99
more than 6,000 mutual funds an investor could put their money into.  As John Keynes, 100
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whose economic theory is the foundation of central banking, said, “never be wrong on your 
own.” 
101
In December 1996, Greenspan gave his famous “irrational exuberance” speech, his first real 
public hint that there was bubble. The next day, the NYSE plunged 140 points in the first hour 
of trading and the New York Times ran a front page story, with the headline “Stocks Worldwide 
Dive, as Greenspan Questions Euphoria.”  He learned his lesson to not doubt the market. He 102
doubled down on his New Economy theory and touted rises in productivity. The S&P 500 
gained about 31 percent in 1997.  He made three rate cuts in 1998. One of them was four 103
days after a company called theglobe.com went public at $9 and closed at $63.50. Its market 
cap was $5 billion and its total earnings for the first three quarters of 1998 were less than $2.7 
million. From February 1996 to October 1999, Greenspan grew the money supply by $1.6 
trillion, which is roughly 20 percent of GDP.  Many took Greenspan’s speeches to heart, 104
including respected economists and journalists like Kevin Hassett and James Glassman, who 
both authored the sensational Dow 36,000 which argued that stocks would quadruple over the 
next five years.  Anyone who didn’t believe Greenspan was also essentially saying every 105
investor in the market was wrong. Although Fed staffer Mike Prell brought up the issue, no one 
at the Fed ever asked him any questions about it.  Greenspan’s predecessor also sounded 106
the alarm in May 1999.  Over the course of 1998 to 2000, he pumped liquidity into the market 107
at every financial tightening: bailing out hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, cutting 
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rates in response to the ruble collapse, and printing $147 billion, in response to the Y2K 
scare. 
108
A 1999 Time magazine adorned its cover with Alan Greenspan, flanked by Clinton officials Bob 
Rubin and Larry Summers, with the headline, “The Committee to Save the World: The inside 
story of how the Three Marketeers have prevented a global economic meltdown—so far.” 
Despite acknowledging the bubble as early as the start of 1994, Greenspan publicly maintained 
that knowing one is in a bubble is an impossible task. For example, in an August 2002 speech, 
Greenspan said, “it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact—that is, 
when it's bursting confirmed its existence.” 
109
“Greenspan apparently had little interest in nipping problems in the bud, preferring instead to clean 
up whatever mess he left behind with the same actions that started the problem—namely, easy 
money.”  110
—Bill Fleckenstein 
The mutual fund industry grew astronomically from 655 funds at the start of 1982, to 8,155 by 
March 2000.  It was also true that while the bubble lasted, putting money into a mutual fund 111
was essentially the best way to invest one’s money. This is a scary dynamic that persists today. 
Considerations about how index funds perpetuate market distortions, and their consequences, 
are examined below.

“You will never see another financial crisis in your lifetime.” 
—Janet Yellen, spring 2018 
“I do worry that we could have another financial crisis.″ 
—Janet Yellen, fall 2018  112
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Boom-busts are not inevitable. In the periods before the formation of the Fed and central 
banks, systemic speculative booms and crashes were exceedingly rare.  Do you really think 113
Jeff Bezos would be worth $185 billion  (post-divorce) if financial crises had not dampened 114
competition? Boom-busts cause a concentration of wealth. It may also be said that speculative 
periods arguably accelerate innovation in technology. But is it such a good thing that Bezos 
wants to move manufacturing to the moon  while here, in the United States, we still suffer 115
with economic inequality, violence, and despair?

Active Is Dying 
“We’ve presumed that everybody else is [performing the due diligence] for us, therefore it’s a fool’s 
game to do it ourselves.”  116
—Mike Green, macro fund manager 
While the dot-com bubble grew, the media kept prodding the public on. The cover of Forbes in 
March 1996 read “In Greenspan We Trust.”  Sell side analysts at big banks became media 117
and radio taking heads. Mary Meeker of Morgan Stanley was heralded as the “Queen of the 
Net.” Henry Blodget of Merrill Lynch was expecting a $12 million salary. It was weird that these 
analysts were getting so much attention. Their incentives were not to opine honestly on 
valuations. Instead, they were beholden to their institutional customers, who wanted the 
consistent earnings growth. They also served as the public relations arm of the bank. When 
they gave a company a strong buy rating, that company was more likely to use them for their 
investment banking needs. The cat was out of the bag too. The New York Times cited Merrill 
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Lynch’s lack of superstar tech analysts that could attract Silicon Valley customers as the 
reason its stock lagged in 1999. A fund manager once called Blodget and told him he was 
“pathetic” and that he was “disgusted” by his behavior. The investor was referring to Blodget’s 
lack of “enthusiasm,” when he talked about one of the stocks the manager owned. Blodget 
had even received physical threats that were left on his voicemail. It’s not surprising that even 
though Blodget saw the bubble forming, he kept whistling through the graveyard. 
118
Greenspan invaded the psyche of Upper East Side cocktail party goers and middle class 
capitalists. Everyone, including the very rich and smart, were mesmerized. Jeremy Grantham 
recalled the year of 1999, when his investors were addicted to the market momentum.

It was psychologically extremely painful because the clients were uniquely vindictive, 
neither before nor since have they taken that attitude. There was something about that 
tech bubble of 1999 that made the clients talk as if we had personally insulted them, 
[and] we had deliberately attempted to lose the money. In other setbacks, that has not 
been the case…The reason they were upset is they completely bought into the new 
golden era that Alan Greenspan and others were talking about, that the internet was 
going to drive away the dark clouds of ignorance and productivity would go through the 
roof and stay there forever. 
119
Many financiers rational enough to see through the narrative were fired, quit or closed down 
shop. Legendary hedge fund manager Julian Robertson closed down, despite predicting the 
tech bubble since investors didn’t believe him. Jeff Vinik, one of the most famous mutual fund 
managers, who was managing Fidelity’s active Magellan Fund, resigned in 1996 after he 
underweighted tech stocks  and rebalanced into bonds right before an interest rate hike.  120 121
Fidelity’s George Vanderheiden also resigned in late 1999, despite predicting the crash and the 
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subsequent resurgence in value opportunities.  These managers won the battle but lost the 122
war. Being too early meant being wrong.  To me, that sounds antithetical to the role of capital 123
markets. This myopic and time-sensitive game has nothing to do with allocating appropriate 
capital to fund business operations.

“The key to Tiger's success over the years has been a steady commitment to buying the best stocks 
and shorting the worst. In a rational environment, this strategy functions well. But in an irrational 
market, where earnings and price considerations take a back seat to mouse clicks and momentum, 
such logic, as we have learned, does not count for much.”  124
—Julian Robertson 
Julian Robertson is one of the most legendary hedge fund managers of all time. He started his 
fund, Tiger, in the 1980s, and achieved an annual compound rate of return of 32 percent 
through the 1990s.  Robertson became fearful of the tech bubble. He underweighted his 125
holdings in the sector to the cries of his investors. The pressure became too great. Robertson 
started Tiger managing $8.8 billion, and grew it up to $22 billion in 1998. His investors started 
liquidating their funds to get in on the dot-com action. Tiger closed down days after the crash 
with only $6.6 billion still under management.

Robertson noted that it was basically like a Ponzi scheme. The only way for active managers to 
survive the mass hysteria brought about by bubbles was to ride them, thus perpetuating the 
inflated values, and then timing the crash perfectly. From a pure value investing perspective, 
Julian Robertson was one of the best who ever lived. As another hedge manager put it at the 
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time, “If he and Warren Buffett are the rational investors of our age, then this is a sign that the 
rational investor has given up. This is symptomatic of what investors face today.” 
126
I have a close personal friend who currently works in Robertson’s family office. He tells me 
when he doesn’t have any stocks in mind for his personal portfolio, he just puts his money in 
the SPY (StateStreet’s S&P 500 index) or the Russel 2000 and watches it grow.

From another angle, the relative costs of active funds have gone up because of low interest 
rates and the advancement of technology. In 1980, when many of the well known hedge fund 
managers started their funds, interest rates were at a high. When cash yields something like 8 
percent, there is a lot less incentive to seek high-risk, high-reward investments to make 12 
percent returns, or whatever the benchmark is. Today, at 0 percent interest rates, this is not the 
case. Value investors are on the decline. Passive and quantitative are in style. With passive and 
quantitative, entrepreneurs can easily “backtest” their algorithms or indices, and get them 
easily approved by the SEC. To be an active manager today, you need to hire a trader, lawyer, 
and portfolio manager. You go through a lengthy approval process, and if you’re just starting 
out, you need to market yourself without a “back-tested track record.”  These costs are too 127
high to bear when interest rates are low.

Culturally, active is also on the decline. Descriptively, there has been less public interest in the 
space, and the duty of active to provide liquidity to the market has been ignored. Baby 
Boomers were the 401(k) generation. They loved making money. Their time gave celebrity 
status to investors like Warren Buffet, Charlie Munger, and Julian Robertson. Those men are 
now dinosaurs. Today, we don’t have any legendary investors. The dinosaurs themselves tell us 
to put our money in indexes.  To be fair, many who would’ve gone the hedge fund route have 128
gotten into private equity, which gets less attention. In today’s climate, being a billionaire just 
attracts negative publicity. However, the corollary is scary. Despite all the talk about Robinhood 
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investors and the Wall Street Bets community, 90 percent of millennial inflows go to passive.  129
Only 2 percent of Robinhood option trades are in the green.  Passive will keep growing.
130
“Most institutional and individual investors will find the best way to own common stock is through 
an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results 
(after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.”  131
—Warren Buffett 
Indexing Is A Momentum Strategy 
If the only way to purchase public equities was via a public market-wide index fund, the 
correlation of stock movements would be 1. The pro-indexing argument says that fundamental 
analysis is futile because someone else is doing the job for you. Burton Malkiel admitted that 
passive investors are free-riders.  Could it be possible that a critical mass of passive renders 132
the public market dysfunctional?

It would be wrong to assume that as indexing rises, a linear trend in capital allocation based off 
of fundamentals deteriorates. Active managers do what they can, including producing a 
documentary , to inform investors so that stocks are fairly valued. Caution, however, should 133
be exercised.

“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are 
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. 
 Mike Green on OddLots podcast. “Why Passive Investing Might Be Distorting The Market.” 129
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Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist." 
—John Maynard Keynes  134
If you asked a student studying finance what the price of a stock is, they would probably tell 
you that it is the discounted future cash flows of the company in reference. This is not true. The 
price of a stock is determined by supply and demand.

Everyone knows the adage “buy low, sell high.” Yet, everyone forgets this rule when it comes 
to indexing. Before 2004, index funds were market cap weighted (they are now float 
weighted).  For an index like the Standard & Poor’s 500, under a market cap weighted index, 135
funds would construct this index by holding stocks of each of the largest 500 companies that 
are listed an a US-based stock exchange in proportion to how much each company makes up 
the aggregate market cap of all those companies. With every rebalancing, which occurs every 
quarter or so, index funds buy high and sell low. If Apple made up 5 percent of the S&P 500 in 
quarter one, but speculators drive up the price of Apple, so that at the rebalancing point it 
makes up 6 percent of the S&P 500, the index will sell off their holdings of companies that now 
account for less of the index, and buy more Apple. In a bond index the fund overweights 
companies that have more debt. Ultimately, indexing is a simple algorithm that buys when 
flows come in, and sells when customers redeem their money.

How did we get here? In the 1960s, Harry Markowitz, who later won a Nobel Memorial Prize for 
this contribution, came up with the notion, trivial today, that investors should consider their 
aggregate (portfolio) risk, instead of trying to manage the individual risks of each of the assets 
they were invested in. In academic terms, a diverse enough portfolio meant investors could pay 
less attention to idiosyncratic risks, like a bad CEO or industry wide shock, and would now 
only be subject to systemic risks, like a global pandemic. This led to the developments of 
modern portfolio theory and showed the benefits of diversification.  While modern portfolio 136
theory has greatly benefited all investors, especially those in mutual funds, it sowed the seeds 
for the erosion of proper due diligence. If one is not paying attention to each individual asset 
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they are invested in—since more research will not be compensated with adequate risk 
reductions—assets become more prone to incorrect pricing.

At the same time, the efficient market hypothesis came out of the Chicago Booth School of 
Business. Academics define three levels of efficient markets, but the essential proposition is 
that a stock’s price fully reflects all public information about the stock. In other words, the 
market is good enough at pricing stocks, and is frictionless enough, so that the best estimate 
of a company’s intrinsic worth is its market capitalization. While it bestowed rationality on the 
market which was reminiscent of Graham’s “intrinsic value,” in some ways, it was antithetical 
to Graham’s value investing strategy about doing one’s own research.

There were many problems with the efficient market hypothesis. Economists, back then and 
today still, have become too romantic about empiricism.  This logic-less way of studying 137
phenomena inevitably has critical biases. In making the EMH, the academics focused on 
discrete events that were easy to study and were more likely to be more efficient: earnings 
announcements, dilutive stock offerings, stock splits, and mergers.  It was also a 138
preposterous time to suggest markets had achieved near perfect efficiency. The 1960’s was the 
era of the “go-go” market, the third major merger wave in the United States, where corporate 
raiders scoured the market for bargains and companies that had valuations below their net 
asset values.

The danger of the efficient market hypothesis was that it gave credence to the index 
momentum strategy.  If Apple went from 5 percent of the S&P 500 to 6 percent, then that was 139
because the market had, as accurately as it could, priced in all public information about Apple. 
It thus made people think that the new stock price of Apple was the most reasonable 
estimation of its worth.
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Some funds offered were more explicitly momentum based. For these funds, allocation was 
based on the trailing 12 or 24-months earnings growth or price movement, a backward looking 
formal momentum strategy. 
140
Why haven’t we stopped using momentum strategies? They work, and work well. They are 
self-reinforcing until the music stops. Today, BlackRock’s momentum fund’s 5-year annual 
return has been 20.06 percent versus its S&P 500 which was 16.78 percent.  Richard 141
Driehaus, who ran a discretionary momentum fund named Driehaus Capital Management, had 
annual average returns (net of fees) of an incredible 40.9 percent for the years 1987 to 1993. 
142
Mike Green, a macro analyst who has worked for the likes of George Soros and Peter Thiel 
who specializes in market structures, attributes some of the overvaluations during the dot-com 
bubble to index funds.  Before the dot com crash, Cisco had a higher index weighting than 143
Exxon and GE, even though Cisco produced less earnings and cash flow.  Theres were 144
issues from the combination of market cap indexes, tech hype, and the general push into 
equities. One of the differences between a tech company and one from another industry is the 
high level of insider ownership. With higher levels of insider ownership, there are fewer 
outstanding shares available. Therefore, when index funds went to build and rebalance their 
indexes, they were putting much more upward pressure on the stock prices of these high 
market cap, low float companies that were prevalent in the tech industry. In 2004, index funds 
quietly changed to a float-based construction method to mitigate some of this liquidity issue. 
145
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What is the big deal about momentum strategies? If they work well and are accessible to 
everyone, what is wrong? While today’s high unemployment remains high and the Dow Jones 
grows, one might conclude that the market is disconnected from reality.  But financial 146
markets effect the real economy. A company with sustained overvaluations leads to the 
misallocation of capital. In 1900, Cisco was trading at 20 times earnings. With every 
incremental piece of news, Cisco’s stock went up. The indices rebalanced to weight Cisco 
more heavily, and momentum funds bought more too. A graph of Cisco’s stock price then was 
basically a vertical line. Cisco made it appear like they were paying employees better by using 
their inflated stock price to fund salaries, reducing reported expenses on their income 
statement, which made the company look even more profitable.  With this market power, 147
Cisco started using its stock to fund acquisitions. These institutional investors were putting 
hard pressure on Cisco to boost its earnings, so they applauded these acquisitions which were 
accretive on paper. Cisco lost 85 percent of its market value during the burst. It is important to 
remember that companies can fund acquisitions via stock instead of boot. Market valuations 
facilitate proper allocations of capital. 

An overpriced stock also gives the wrong signals to other stakeholders. In 2006, Eddie 
Lampert, the chairman of Sears Holdings put it nicely. According to hedge fund manager and 
author Jeff Gramm, Lampert was asking an investing conference how it was possible to 
properly run a company when it is overpriced. How can managers meet unrealistic investor 
expectations? (Take more risk.) But then, how does one deal with employee morale, when hard 
working employees see their employer’s stock inevitably go down? Lampert knew what he was 
talking about: the day before the conference, Sears was trading at $175. It was now at $35. 
148
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“The return pattern of the newly-included S&P 500 member changes magically and quickly. It 
begins to move more closely with its 499 new neighbors and less closely with the rest of the market. 
It is as if it has joined a new school of fish.”  149
—Jefferey Wurgler, NYU Professor of Finance 
The full potential of index funds was realized in 1994 when the chairman of the SEC, Arthur 
Levitt, a Wall Street veteran, oversaw a study on the use of futures by mutual funds. He was a 
fighter for the individual investor. He had the support of Warren Buffet in 1991, when he 
campaigned against the Financial Accounting Standards Board for more transparent executive 
compensation accounting, since he recognized that the prevalent insider stock options being 
issued diluted the value of existing shares.  Using “cash-free” options as compensation but 150
reporting them as an expense was one of many corporate gimmicks used to meet the 
demands of institutional investors’ who wanted consistent earnings growth. Familiar with 
derivatives, in 1994, Levitt commissioned a large study to evaluate the risks of allowing mutual 
funds to use derivatives. At this time, indexes only accounted for 2 percent of the investment 
universe since they had not fully proved themselves yet.  More importantly, they still hadn’t 151
calibrated their distribution and trading activities to retain the integrity of the indexes. Under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, mutual funds were restricted from using leverage.  Since 152
derivatives were an obligation to a stakeholder other than fund shareholders, the SEC 
interpreted this prohibition to generally include futures. Therefore, the use of futures was 
limited. At the time, only 2.13 percent of total net assets in mutual funds consisted of futures, 
and 84 percent of those futures were used for fixed income funds.  So generally, there were 153
two ways to track an equity index back then: “complete replication,” whereby all the stocks in 
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the index were bought according to their weighting, or “stratified sampling,” whereby samples 
were taken to avoid the liquidity problems of smaller companies.  Index funds were 154
experiencing heavy tracking error, since there were large fluctuations in liquidity between 
securities in the index. Despite still being a sliver of the investment universe, they were already 
big enough that their transactions had material market impacts.  This creates drag whereby 155
the index fund is comprised of a distribution of assets that does not match the index. John 
Bogle Jr. does his best to avoid market impacts by capping the assets under management at 
his three mutual funds in Massachusetts at the tiny level of $100 million.  The use of futures 156
helps mitigate market impacts, since the transactions are not immediate purchases and prices 
can be locked in. Gus Sauter, a fund manager at Vanguard, who later pioneered the ETF 
movement , identified this in 1987.  Levitt’s study convinced the SEC to make it easier for 157 158
mutual funds to use futures, which ignited a revolution in derivatives in the 1990s. It helped that 
Greenspan was not worried about risks from derivatives, who had said that there was 
“negligible” risk that derivatives could someday require a taxpayer bailout (recall AIG).  Index 159
funds went from 2 percent of the investment universe to 10 percent over the course of a couple 
of years.  The share of passively managed investments then rose to 34 percent in 2010  to 160 161
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about 50 percent  today.  Since around 1997, strong co-movement in the stock market has 162
been trending upwards. 
163
The benchmark mantra, which was started by financial advisor and data provider Morning Star 
during the 1990s, also means that active managers are being measured against say, the S&P 
500, which forces them to hold high concentrations of the underlying assets in the S&P 500. As 
high-profile activist Bill Ackman notes, individual investors are as myopic as anyone else. If a 
fund underperforms the benchmark by a considerable amount just once, they move their 
money.  Thus, active managers too are now forced to invest similar to an index fund. This 164
“closet indexing” has been trending since the mid-1990s. 
165
This all suggests individual stock movements have less to do with real information, but instead 
are due to their inclusion in an index. Numerous studies have shown the large jumps in 
valuations of companies when they get included in major indexes. Penn State researchers 
showed a statistically significant mean abnormal S&P 500 inclusion announcement-day return 
of 5.67 percent for the period 1993 to 2001.  NYU Professor Jefferey Wurgler also shows that 166
when a stock is included in the S&P 500, its stock price movements become closely correlated 
with S&P 500 returns, diverging from previous movement trends. It’s troubling that this pattern 
is occurring with the largest and most liquid stocks. 
167
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On August 23, 2016, an analyst at Alliance Bernstein decided to analyze the impact of passive 
investors on the mining sector, which possesses the major qualities of a sector that is heavily 
dependent on proper capital allocation: it is capital intensive, sensitive to volatility, systemically 
important, has a long lead time and similarly takes a long time to generate alpha. Although 
markets go back further than Genesis, only until the development of copper porphyry deposits 
at the start of the twentieth century, did markets take on their modern form of supplying capital 
to large, risky, long-term projects, that is ever apparent today with the IPOs of tech companies 
with negative cash flows. The Bernstein theory asserts that passive cannot properly allocate 
capital, since it is inherently backward looking. A passive strategy buys assets according to 
their current value in the financial economy, while ignoring future needs of the real economy. 
Compare that to an active strategy, which anticipates the fundamental changes that will affect 
an asset’s fair value. Passive is momentum, while active is self-correcting. The analysts 
determined that passive concentration slowed the pricing ability of the market, which has 
caused major differences between real expectations and market prices in commodities. They 
37
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also discuss the co-movement issue.  Swiss practitioners Bolla, Kohler and Wittig use cross-168
regional regressions to suggest a casual link between the share of passively held assets and 
trading volume and liquidity. They determined that there was a strong relationship where a 
higher passive share increased commonality of returns and liquidity, which increased the 
likelihood of tail-end event.  Although indexing is an outgrowth of portfolio theory, the co-169
movement effects of passive ironically make it harder to diversify a portfolio.

The Alliance Bernstein note was written by Inigo Fraser-Jenkins, a well-known quantitative sell 
side analyst, and it was provocatively titled, “The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive 
Investing is Worse Than Marxism,” alluding to Hayek. The note made the argument that, at 
least in a Soviet-style centrally planned economy, the apparatchiks would try to allocate capital 
efficiently, while passive managers ignore fundamentals all together. Although Bill Ackman 
raised passive concerns in his 2015 shareholder letter half a year earlier , this piece stuck a 170
note with index maximalists. Bogle-heads laughed it off, and Burton Malkiel wrote a rebuttal in 
the Wall Street Journal, citing the historical outperformance of indexes over active.  Every 171
major financial news site covered the piece, and although they mostly laughed at the 
hyperbole, the journalists now knew to keep their eyes open. Matt Levine, a popular financial 
columnist at Bloomberg, has been particularly keen on the index fund controversy. In an email 
exchange with Bloomberg, Michael Burry, the quirky hedge fund manager who predicted the 
housing crisis and was the focus of Michael Lewis’ The Big Short, said we are in a “passive 
bubble” that rewards large companies at the expense of small companies.  Due to the 172
liquidity issues of small cap companies, and because indexing is a momentum strategy, 
indexing creates a big-get-bigger phenomenon. Since the Bernstein note, there have been 
many developments in index fund research. The characteristically provocative Lucian Bebchuk, 
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who leads Harvard’s corporate governance department, started looking at the quality of 
stewardship at index funds. John Coates, another Harvard law professor who is now an acting 
director at the SEC , wrote a paper called “The Problem of Twelve,” hypothesizing that we are 173
approaching a world where just twelve individuals might control all of corporate America due to 
the rising concentration of index providers. 
174
“If everybody indexed, the only word you could use is chaos, catastrophe. There would be no 
trading, there would be no way to convert a stream of income into a pile of capital or a pile of 
capital into a stream of income. The markets would fail.” 
—John Bogle, 2017  175
After The Bubble 
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” 
—George Santayana 
After the dot-com crash, something happened that had not occurred in prior crashes. People 
didn’t sell. Passive inflows remained stable in the years 1999-2001.  People had taken the 176
“buy and hold” ethos to heart. The indexing experiment was set in stone.

To address the decimated equity prices, Greenspan slashed rates to an all-time low of 1 
percent, sowing the seeds for the housing crisis.  This was done with support of Neo-177
Keynesians, like New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, who notoriously wrote:
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To fight this recession the Fed needs more than a snapback; it needs soaring household 
spending to offset moribund business investment. And to do that, as Paul McCulley of 
Pimco put it, Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq 
bubble. 
178
When the crash happened in 2008, the value of State Street’s index fund that tracks the S&P 
500, SPY, halved over the course a year and a half. While Barclay’s was in distress, the bank 
auctioned off its ETF business, Barclay’s Global Investors, and BlackRock bought it for $13.5 
billion, more than doubling its AUM.  BlackRock obtained the “iShares” brand. The corollary 179
of crashes is that the big get bigger, and the small get smaller. Every time there is a crash, the 
scales are temporarily shifted to big firms, which if they take advantage of it, come out 
stronger. Monetary policy should be a much more important discussion in our politics.

However, with the above exception, unlike in the dot-com bubble, passive didn’t play much of 
a role in the housing crisis. Yet, trading derivatives, made up of hundreds of loans that no one 
cared to double check the value of, was eerily similar to the index funds buying up the market 




George Bush came into office in 2001 after a campaign that advocated tax cuts. The “Bush Tax 
Cut” was the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 2001. Included were retirement plan changes that 
were favorable to increased saving. Portman-Cardin Provisions raised the limits on how large 
contributions could be.  Employees 50 years or older could “catch-up” by contributing 180
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another few thousand dollars to their plans.  This legislation was meaningful in cementing the 181
use of 401(k)s and IRAs.

The Pension Protection Act of 2006 was then passed, which supported contribution 
participation. Before the act, the employee would generally bear the responsibility of 
contributing to their plan and choosing how to do that. Recall in the 1990s when America 
became obsessed with yield and people were sifting through the Wall Street Journal for the 
best funds.  Legislators were concerned that the average employee was not contributing as 182
much as they needed to, and that they didn’t know how to allocate their funds. If contributors 
did not select what products to invest in, their funds would be put into a money market fund.  183
The bill made two major changes. It set automatic contributions into 401(k)s as a default; 
employees would need to opt out, making it more likely that individuals would be saving for 
retirement. The bill also defined the qualified default investment alternative (QDIA), which 
identified what could be set as the default vehicle contributions go to. The human resources 
team constructed the default menu from those criteria, which inevitably have consisted of 
diversified, passive vehicles.  Yet still, in 2008, just 60 percent of eligible employees 184
contributed to their 401(k). 
185
In 2012, the Department of Labor decided to further define QDIAs. They dictated that target 
date funds are practically the only QDIA. Target date funds are a vehicle that was invented in 
2003. A target date fund is a mix of passive equity and passive bond funds that allocates more 
towards bonds with the employee’s age. Nearly 80 percent of all dollars going into 401(k)s are 
now flowing into target date funds. 
186
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In 2013, the Obama White House launched an investigation into expanding the applicability of 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s fiduciary duties to various retirement savings 
plans.  By their estimates, biased financial advice snatched $17 billion a year from retirement 187
accounts.  By 2015, they proposed a controversial fiduciary rule that would make all financial 188
professionals that work or advise on retirement plans legally and ethically fiduciaries.  Smaller 189
registered investment advisors and actively managed funds protested the rule, since it would 
significantly increase compliance costs. Even larger retirement advisors, such as MetLife Inc. 
and American International Group were sold in anticipation of the rule’s implementation.  190
Previously, advisors had to offer “suitable” recommendations. Now, as fiduciaries, they had to 
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recommend the “best” possible funds.  As a result, the menu of choices offered to an 191
employee had to consist of low-fee funds, which are, by definition, index funds or target date 
funds. Corporation are now liable for excess fees charged by funds they recommended. Worse, 
they are liable for underperformance of recommendations.  The takeaway is “don’t try to beat 192
the market, be the market.” This ignited a shift into passive vehicles in 2016.

After the passage of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, the most substantial tax reform bill 
since the Reagan years, some congressmen were concerned that President Trump wasn’t 
being fiscally responsible. Some pointed out the increase in stock buybacks.  The Congress 193
members began writing the SECURE Act. One of the original goals was to reduce the tax 
deductibility of 401(k)s beyond a certain level. BlackRock and Vanguard got their hands on it 
and extended the tax deductibility of 401(k)s. They also deferred the age of “required” 
withdrawals from 70.5 to 72, expanding the time workers would remain their customers. 
194
The Big Three spend a lot on lobbying. Vanguard spent $2.5 million in 2019 on lobbying 
efforts.  In total, the Big Three spent $6.4 million in 2019.  Richard Neal (D-MA), the 195 196
Chairman of the Means and Ways Committee, which writes the legislation for issues including 
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retirement and tax issues, received about $30,000 from the mutual fund industry leading up to 
the SECURE Act. 
197
“[To] get a monopoly; let Society work for you; and remember that the best of all business is 
politics, for a legislative grant, franchise, subsidy or tax exemption is worth more than a Kimberly 
or Comstock lode, since it does not require any labor, either mental or physical, for its 
exploitation.”  198
—Confessions of a Monopolist 
The joke today is that Democrats hire from BlackRock and Republicans hire from Goldman. 
Goldman is notorious for its cutthroat attitude towards other banks and its willingness to 
leverage government.  Its nickname is “Government Sachs.”  BlackRock too, which is the 199 200
largest index provider, has also deeply embedded itself in the political realm.

Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, routinely meets with world leaders. In July 2018, he 
participated in a dinner U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May hosted for President Donald Trump. 
Since the 2008 crisis, the firm has had 400 meetings or calls with senior US officials and more 
than 50 with senior UK officials.  In January 2019, President-Elect Joe Biden visited Larry 201
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Fink in BlackRock’s New York office to discuss the state of the world. Fink told Biden, “I’m here 
to help.”  In the 2018 election cycle, BlackRock donated $1.5 million to federal candidates. 
202 203
Further, the human capital at the Manhattan office and the Beltway are becoming more 
synonymous. The firm has hired at least 84 former US government officials since 2004.  204
These include influential figures like Cheryl Mills, Hillary Clinton’s former chief of staff,  and 205
Brian Deese, a climate adviser to President Obama.  Carol Lee was taken in by the SEC from 206
BlackRock’s compliance department. 
207
More recently, BlackRock has been able to use its leverage to convince the government to not 
consider it a systemically important financial institution (SIFI) , a designation colloquially 208
known as “too big to fail," despite managing client money totaling $8.7 trillion.  After the 2008 209
crisis, the Office of Financial Research at the Treasury Department warned that large asset 
managers pose a risk to the financial system. BlackRock paid $46,000 to Senator Mark Warner 
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(D-VA), who then switched his stance on BlackRock, now defending them.  In 2014, the U.S. 210
panel altered its approach to financial stability risks, and said it would focus on monitoring 
large asset managers’ “products and activities” instead of the firms themselves.  This is a 211
break from how the Financial Stability Oversight Council regulates banks. To be clear, SIFI 
designations for any firm or product have externalities, but this effort highlights the power of 
BlackRock.

President Joe Biden put BlackRock’s Brian Deese back into politics as the current director of 
the National Economic Council.  He also brought in Adewale Adeyemo, a former senior 212
adviser and interim chief of staff to Larry Fink and president of the Obama Foundation, to serve 
as Deputy of the Treasury Secretary under Janet Yellen.  Vice President Kamala Harris chose 213
BlackRock’s Global Chief Investment Strategist Mike Pyle, a former Obama aide, to be her 
chief economic advisor.  There is no doubt that BlackRock’s government involvement has 214





Each regulation mentioned above was made with the best of intentions. For the most part, 
each has been about protecting citizens, encouraging them to save for retirement, and making 
that process simpler.
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The graph below shows the holdings of mutual fund assets over time. Notice the post-1994 
Levitt commission jump, the increasing holdings during the 1995-1999 period, the sharp 
increase after the Bush tax cuts, slight steepening in 2006 after the Pension Protection Act, the 
large 2012 increase in assets, the increase in 2017 with the phase in of the fiduciary rule, and 
the increase in assets with the passing of the SECURE Act in 2019. You can also notice the 





Retirement assets and their share of mutual fund assets, 1974–2020
Source: Benjamin Braun. “Asset Manager Capitalism as a Corporate Governance Regime.” March 2021. Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies. Accessible at https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/v6gue
Capital Stewardship 
“Vanguard’s vote and our voice on governance are the most important levers we have to protect 
our clients’ investments.”  215
—William McNabb, Vanguard’s then-CEO 
Thus far, the distortions that index funds create on the markets are clear. However, markets 
don’t exist in a vacuum; the same problems that produced unchecked prices and the rejection 
of fundamentals manifest in the corporate governance of public companies.

Since the advent of the mutual fund, theorizers have tendered reasons for why the vehicle 
would be a good steward of capital. The Fortune magazine article that inspired Bogle’s 1951 
thesis that got him his job at Wellington Management, which identified the mere 125 firm 
industry , made the notion that the industry “could become immensely influential…the ideal 216
champion of the small stockholder in controversies with…corporate management.”  The 217
mutual fund industry, under Bogle’s lead, would surely be the champion of the individual 
investor, but not of corporate governance. This is because mutual funds are agents with no 





The story of General Motors tells the deep misfortune of companies whose investors are 
agnostic. In this scenario, it wasn’t just index funds. Most investors were disconnected.
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The superstar engineer, whose invention precedes him, John DeLorean, quit General Motors in 
1973 and wrote the bestseller On A Clear Day You Can See General Motors. What he noticed 
was that when leadership lack proper incentives, the whole company succumbs to myopia and 
group think. He didn’t yet know that the worst was yet to come.

During the 1920s, investor bases were described as “owner capitalists.” They were people or 
firms that had large blocks of ownership and exerted managerial oversight. General Motors’ 
previous CEO Alfred Sloan could he characterized as an owner capitalist. He had a large stake 
in General Motors and fought tirelessly for the company’s success. He attributes the 
impressive rise of General Motors in the 1950s to his management style, whereby dissent was 
encouraged and management was extremely decentralized. Over Sloan’s tenure, he turned 
what was an insolvent company in 1920 into the one that constituted half of the automotive 
market share by 1956. 
219
When Smith took the reins in 1981, General Motors had deteriorated into a highly centralized, 
bureaucratic organization. Unfortunately, he did not make improvements. For investors, the 
writing was on the wall. In total, Smith spent almost $100 billion on silly acquisitions and 
R&D.  For example, the company paid $5 billion to purchase a defense contractor that made 220
satellites.  New car models failed miserably. In 1984, one of the misguided acquisitions was 221
Ross Perot’s tech company. The deal made Perot the largest shareholder of GM and a 
director.  Perot was surprised but accepted the lucrative offer.
222
It didn’t take long for Perot to sour on General Motors. He lambasted Smith and the other 
directors. They had minimal stock ownership, were seen as bullies to employees, and were 
making terrible financial choices. A year later, the board offered to buyout Perot for $700 
million. He would have to resign from the board. On December 1, 1986, the contract was 
signed. Perot could not believe that not a single director opposed the proposition. He shortly 
released a press release:
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—putting over 30,000 people out of work,





—and having problems with profitability,

I have just received $700 million. […] I cannot accept this money without giving the GM 
directors another chance to consider this decision. 
223
Though the subject permeated through newsrooms, institutional investors didn’t care. Despite 
media traction, the buyout succeeded with only 20 percent of shareholders dissenting. 
Investors were asleep at the wheel, even when General Motors’ troubles were not just 
apparent, but were “[poking] us in the head and stomach,” in the words of Charlie Munger.  224
Ironically, the story of General Motors evolved during the Vietnam era, a high point in American 
questioning of the status-quo. It seemed the prevailing financial wisdom was impervious.

Part of the General Motors story surely has to do with the agency problems identified by Berle 
and Means. If a company has a set of large and diverse shareholders, who is really overseeing 
management? Portfolio theory takes it a step further: small shareholders not only lack a voice, 
but they lack a need to have a voice. Take a company like Facebook or Tesla: each has heavy 
ownership by motivated insiders (Mark Zuckerberg has effective control of 58 percent of 
Facebook with super class voting shares ). This owner-manager structure enables the 225
innovation we have witnessed in these companies (although manager entrenchment has its 
own problems, as we know from Robert Young). At the height of General Motors in the 1950s, 
institutional ownership accounted for 10 percent ownership in the total market. By the late 
1980s, 50 percent of the market was held by institutional owners. Although this included 
discretionary hedge funds, the majority of institutional owners were pension funds and was 
shifting to mutual funds.
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“Broad institutional ownership had the peculiar effect of disempowering shareholders. By the time 
GM bought Ross Perot off its board, shareholders had little say in the company’s affair beyond 
muted grumbling.”  226
—Jeff Gramm, hedge fund manager and author of Dear Chairman 
 
The General Motors debacle actually woke up some investors, particularly the California Public 
Employees Retirement System (CalPERS). CalPERS wrote a letter to General Motor’s board to 
remove Smith as CEO.  CalPERS has since been a characteristically engaged investor.
227
At the time, in the late 1980s, new ideas of corporate governance emerged. Hostile takeovers 
as a method of holding a management team accountable no longer make sense. In 1982, 
Martin Marietta, a defense contractor led by military veterans, fought bravely (and recklessly) 
against a tender offer from Bendix, a manufacturing company led by the eccentric Bill Agee. 
The two companies ultimately each owned half of one another (a tactic known as the Pac-Man 
defense). 
228
Despite developments in aligning management incentives through stock ownership and 
introducing outside directors, a large set of diverse (and diversified) shareholders meant there 
were few who could take on the monitoring responsibility. Since passive funds were gaining a 
foothold in the market, some saw them as a promising solution to the diverse shareholder 
issue. All of the shares one owns in a mutual fund are controlled by the mutual fund. The fund 
has the right to vote those shares, which they essentially always do so in a centralized fashion. 
Some believed that mutual funds would use that right to engage with management teams to 
defend shareholders. They believed that index funds, though passive vehicles, were competing 
with non-equity investments, like real estate, and were also competing against active investors. 
They thought that this competition would encourage index funds to monitor the companies 
they own.  But that is obviously not what happened. Managers of passive funds are 229
compensated by assets under management, not performance. If they did care about 
performance, and they engaged with portfolio companies, they would be subsidizing profits for 
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their competitors. Their competitors include other passive funds, and moreover, active funds 
with large bets on those companies, voiding the above argument. It is still an issue of collective 
action.

The only exception to the collective action problem would be if a firm had large holdings in a 
certain company or sets of companies. 
230
The other common reasoning index-enthusiasts promoted was that since index funds have no 
option to vote with their feet, they would work with what they had in their portfolio.  Indexes 231
only sell for customer redemptions and index re-weightings, not for overvaluations or 




With the rise of the institutional investor, the Berle and Means prediction of the mature 
company being owned by dispersed, “atomistic” investors didn’t materialize. Although returns 
flow to fund shareholders, the largest 20 institutional investors own 33 percent of the 20 largest 
companies. 
232
However, the consequences Berle and Means predicted have been realized. Today’s public 
company is owned by apathetic investors and atomistic investors. Mixing these two causes 
concern. Atomistic investors don’t vote. This is the Berle Means problem. When mutual funds 
vote, they realize more control due to these atomistic investors. However, what is clearly more 
worrisome than their votes is their apathy. An average of 92.5 percent of the Big Three’s 
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portfolio companies received no shareholder engagement whatsoever during the years 2017 
through 2019. 
233
It is easy to figure out why mutual funds are so apathetic. When Bogle introduced the Vanguard 
First Index Investment Trust, he had just one staff member to manage the votes.  During the 234
1980s, passive investors, like mutual funds and pension funds sat idly as raiders, like Carl 
Icahn stole company capital and shareholder wealth via greenmail. One pension fund manager 
who didn’t even understand what a poison pill was, said, “I’ll define the long term. That’s my 
job.”  Today, Vanguard has just 15 staff that oversee voting and stewardship across its 235
13,000 portfolio companies. BlackRock has 24 for its 14,000 portfolio companies. And State 
Street has fewer than 10.  This means that a very small number of relatively uninformed 236
people are responsible for casting meaningful blocks of votes. From 2012 to 2018, BlackRock, 
State Street, and Vanguard voted against corporate compensation proposals an average of 2.0 
percent, 2.9 percent, and 4.4 percent of the time, respectively. 
237
Moreover, there are direct incentives for mutual funds to be deferential to management teams. 
This phenomenon has played out since the introduction of the 401(k).  The index providers 238
derive business from 401(k)s providers that are mostly public companies.  Since their 239
invention, mutual funds have sought to profit from them, at the expense of shareholders. 
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Mutual funds would pay consultants to recommend their funds to companies.  By one 2004 240
estimate, 90 percent of 401(k)s were engaged in “revenue sharing” plans.  Some of these 241
concerns were mitigated in the Pension Protection Act of 2006.  In 2015, 60 percent of 242
401(k)s were held in mutual funds.  Today, human resources departments have a large role in 243
selecting what funds to put employee 401(k)s in.  There is an obvious incentive to choose 244
funds from providers that “like” the company. It is similar to how companies like to hire 
investment banks whose sell side analysts “like” them. Employees have the option of directing 
their money as they please, but it is a lengthy and burdensome process to elect for something 
different. As mentioned earlier, due to the Pension Protection Act of 2006, employee money is 
by default put into 401(k)s that are almost always invested in passive funds.  The index funds 245
engage with these companies to market their QDIAs, which since 2012, have been target date 
funds.  Several studies have shown that corporate relations affects mutual fund voting 246
decisions. In particular, they show that the funds are deferential to the desires of the incumbent 
management teams, which makes sense given the companies are sources of business for 
them. 
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Additionally, under the Exchange Act of 1934, those who own 5 percent or more of a publicly 
traded company must register their stake with the SEC.  Owners who are “passive” must file 248
a Section 13G. Owners who are active, meaning they seek high levels of engagement with the 
company, must file a 13D. 13Ds are subject to substantially more disclosure requirements, 
reducing mutual fund providers’ incentive to engage.  BlackRock only ran its first activist 249
campaign in 2016. 
250
Investment banks provide advisory services to companies for investor relations purposes. PJT 
Partners has an investor relations arm. Goldman Sachs and Evercore are known for their 
activism defense practices, which help companies navigate contentious shareholders. Similar 
to a sell side analyst, the service is partly run to source future, more lucrative, investment 
banking services. From conversations I’ve had with Evercore, it appears that the activist 
defense job emphasizes lobbying institutional investors to be in favor of the company (which 
the investment bank is working for and wants more business from) rather than analyzing the 
demands of an activist. Evercore and BlackRock share the same New York office building. 
251
On February 17, 2015, Trian Partners, an activist hedge fund, led by Nelson Peltz, that is 
known for addressing long-term strategic goals rather than myopic recapitalizations, submitted 
a white paper to the SEC, with the slogan “DuPont Can Be Great.”  Although DuPont’s stock 252
looked like it was performing well, this was relative to the overall market. Trian pointed out that 
compared to competitors, such as Monsanto, DuPont was trailing. The white paper identified 
multiple missteps that showed poor corporate governance and a complete lack of effort to 
maintain market share. For example, Trian criticized DuPont’s CEO for selling a large fraction of 
her shares in DuPont to index funds, which reduced her incentive to maximize DuPont 
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shareholder value. Peltz expressed frustration that “DuPont willingly violated a Monsanto 
patent, then chose to pay $750m more than required in a settlement, and entered a licensing 
agreement with Monsanto until 2023, effectively pre-committing future cash flows to the 
competitor,”  according to Oxford Professor Martin Schmalz. DuPont’s R&D had also been 253
lacking. Mutual funds voted against Peltz’s slate of directors, despite support for Trian from the 
largest proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services. The company lost billions in 
market capitalization, and Monsanto’s stock rose 3.5 percent. The vote garnered attention, 
since BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, usually referred to as “passive” investors, played 
a crucial role in the campaign’s failure.  Peltz’s proxy contest won the votes of most active 254
managers with stakes in the company.  Events such as this one have made some researchers 255




“Show me the incentive and I will show you the outcome.” 
—Charlie Munger 
The final extension of the corporate governance problem with passive investors is common 
ownership. In his blog, Schmalz, who authored what could be called the seminal paper on 
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common ownership years earlier, identified that the major shareholders of both DuPont and 
Monsanto were the same funds: these were mainly Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street.  256
Any efforts to increase market share at the expense of profits, such as lowering seed prices or 
increasing R&D spend, would provide no benefit to the major shareholders of DuPont and 
Monsanto.

The idea of common ownership is a new paradigm of monopoly power. Under the Adam Smith 
model, which seems simple today, a firm’s purpose is to maximize the wealth of its 
shareholders.  After Milton Friedman penned the eloquently reasoned piece called “The 257
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits” published in the New York Times 
magazine in 1970 , shareholder primacy became synonymous with profit maximization, or the 258
“Friedman Doctrine.”  Interestingly, Friedman’s other works did not assume that shareholder 259
wealth was the same as profits. 
260
However, what happens if one firm’s shareholders are the same as their competitor’s? Assume 
Coca-Cola and Pepsi were owned completely by the same person. The two firms would have 
no reason to compete, and the structure would essentially change the objective function of 
each firm.  Following the Berle and Means principles, some atomistic investor owning both 261
Coca-Cola and Pepsi is no cause for concern. But those dynamics start to change once non-
atomistic owners become large and sticky, however.
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Starting in the 18th century, America’s corporate governance regime could be described as a 
Quaker dominated mercantile class, with many family-run businesses.  With the industrial 262
revolution, Robber Barons of the 19th century dominated. After monopoly break-ups, a 
managerial class then emerged, that was quickly called into question by shareholder activists, 
like Benjamin Graham. With the introduction of pension funds from the likes of General Motors, 
and after a string of corporate takeovers, an era of individual shareholder primacy emerged. 
With the roots planted in 1980, as the bull market ending in the dot-com bubble emerged, 
“asset manager capitalism,” an outgrowth of portfolio theory, prevailed, being fully realized 




In 1984, a Harvard professor named Julio Rotemberg became curious about “monopolistic 
competition,” and laid out the theoretical framework by which common ownership would 
manifest.  He concluded that to avoid such anti-competitive effects, policy makers should 264
 Lewis Braham. The House That Bogle Built. McGraw-Hill. 2011. Chapter 14, page 191262
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consider taxing portfolio diversification.  Farrell (1985) asserted that when firms are held by 265
an individual whose ownership stake is greater than their consumption stake, profits are 
pursued over consumer surplus. For any of the behemoth mutual funds, that case is met. 
266
Rubin (2006) proposed the theory that diversified shareholders care about industry or economy 
performance, not individual firm performance.  Economically that theory holds in cases such 267
as the Texaco and Pennzoil litigation battle in the early 1900s. The “black knight” Pennzoil 
litigated Texaco into bankruptcy, winning an $11 billion award, over Texaco’s interference in 
Pennzoil’s attempted acquisition of Getty Oil.  The deployment of capital for litigation might 268
make sense to a non-diversified shareholder of either firm, but to a diversified shareholder, 
wealth was being transferred from their pockets to lawyers’ pockets. From a societal 
perspective, this is also probably not favorable (unless you really like lawyers). However, 
diversified investors should consider that when firms do not pursue profit maximization of their 
own firm when it comes to product and labor markets, they engender unfavorable conditions 
for long-term economic growth. 
269
Other contributors to the theory include Hansen and Lott (1996)  and Admati, Peiderer, and 270
Zechner (1994),  O’Brien, Salop (2000) , and Gilo, David, Yossi Moshe, Yossi Spiegel 271 272
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(2006) . Together, the theory of how diverse and diversified shareholders could change the 273
traditionally accepted objective function of a firm has existed for decades. But in social 
sciences, measurable effects require a critical mass of evidence.

Now that passive funds hold about half of all public equities, the effects have been observable. 
If every shareholder was fully diversified (for the sake of argument, consider this to include all 
public equities), the incentive of every public firm would be to act as an economy-wide 
monopoly.  Around 2014, researchers found empirical evidence that commonly owned firms 274




Similar to the regressive interest rate manipulation tax, whereby those who require more cash 
on hand suffer from dollar devaluation, an economy-wide monopoly also disproportionately 
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benefits those who have more money in the stock market over those who cannot afford to 
save. To put this in perspective, the top 1 percent own 50 percent of the corporate equity and 
mutual fund shares, and the top 10 per cent own 86 percent.  By the same token, lowering 275
interest rates below market dictated levels and mass portfolio diversification create economic 
inequality. The index fund may be the champion of the individual investor, but it may not be the 
champion of the individual.

In 2014, University of Michigan Professor Martin Schmalz (who is now at Oxford), economist 
José Azar who was working at Charles Rivers Associates at the time, and his colleague Isabel 
Tecu, released a working paper that for the first time showed empirical evidence of 
anticompetitive effects from diversified shareholdings, by looking at the airlines industry. Azar 
had been musing on this for years, publishing his first paper on the topic in 2012 in the form of 
his Princeton PhD thesis.  The 2014 “Airlines Paper" concluded that common ownership of 276
airlines was correlated with ticket price increases of 3 to 7 percent.  The paper was met with 277
an extreme backlash. For reasons beyond my knowledge, the paper was characterized as 
evidence of explicit collusion directed by index fund managers. BlackRock’s head of policy and 
stewardship Barbara Novick, who led the lobbying effort to avoid a SIFI designation , called it 278
a “sensationalist campaign.”  Before the paper was even published in the Journal of Finance 279
in 2018, Harvard Law Professor Einer Elhauge proposed to use the Clayton Act’s Section 7 to 
prevent firms from owning stakes in competing firms.  Professors Eric Posner and Glen Weyl 280
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61
from the University of Chicago called the issue “the antitrust challenge of our time.”  281
BlackRock called out Schmalz et al. for not yet publishing their data, which for a yet to be 
published paper is common. However, such a large debate about an issue in absence of 
replicability is rare.  (They published the data when the paper was published.) Every financial 282
news journal had an article covering the issue. Eric Posner and Glen Weyl later wrote a book in 
2020, Radical Markets, where they call for “dismembering the octopus.” 
283
What ensued was a mischaracterization of the claims. The debate quickly moved from the 
theoretical foundations and calculations to questions of whether large index providers were 
explicitly telling corporations to collude. Recalling Bebchuk’s research on the low engagement 
rates and poor stewardship of index funds, a clear mechanism or incentive to tell managers to 
collude is highly questionable. In fact, Bebchuk wrote his own response to the research, not 
properly identifying the claims, titled “The Misguided Attack on Common Ownership.”  284
Schmalz et al. certainly have never claimed that the fund providers consciously call for 
collusion. The paper makes the claim that by nature of diversified portfolios that are so large, it 
is not surprising if competition is dampened. In fact, later publications by the authors have 
hinted at what is the most reasonable conclusion, which is that the passive nature of the funds 
actually contributes to the problem. 
285
It is worth noting that the large index providers have, on rare occasion, overtly called for 
product and labor level changes, deviating from the “high level” engagement narrative. In 2018, 
a group of institutional investors—namely State Street, TIAA’s investment manager Nuveen, 
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and some pension funds including CalPERS—banded together to address the two large 
firearm manufacturers Strum, Ruger & Co and American Outdoor Brands Corp. (Smith & 
Wesson). They laid out demands that even included product changes. The companies obliged 
to increasing their reporting on gun violence, but otherwise scoffed at the demands.  This 286
voids the theory that the “Big Three” don’t at least try to effectuate product-level changes. 
However, more importantly, the vote-with-one’s-feet theory is turned upside down. Previous 
theorizers believed that since index funds cannot vote with their feet, they would be 
incentivized to push for changes at companies. But as it turns out, the inability to divest 
ownership in a company means that managers can ignore shareholder demands.

Nevertheless, Second Amendment fans aren’t keen on product changes. Managers in other 
industries might welcome recommendations. At a panel at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Larry Fink said, “We can tell a company to fire 5000 employees tomorrow or tell a 
company to do something that maybe is bad for the environment, and if that maximizes return 
for the company, we did something well.”  It is clear that index funds can effectuate changes, 287
even at the product and labor levels. But ultimately, these funds often don’t engage, and their 
real impact is on lack of managerial incentives. As BlackRock’s Barbara Novick has mentioned, 
airlines make up less than half a percent of their holdings. 
288
The “Airlines Paper” was also attacked for some of its calculations. Some of Schmalz et al.’s 
colleagues do not think they are the best.  Specifically, the method of measuring common 289
ownership, the main explanatory variable in the study, has been called into question. Schmalz 
et al. use a Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (MHHI) that was developed by Georgetown 
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Law professor Steven Salop and then-Deputy Director of FTC’s Bureau of Economics  Daniel 290
O’Brien in 2000.  In 2015, O’Brien wrote a paper that disagreed with how Schmalz et al. had 291
applied the MHHI.  The MHHI is built off of the commonly used Herfindahl-Hirschman index 292
(HHI). The HHI is a measure of industry concentration. An industry’s HHI is computed by 
summing the squares of each firm’s market share in a defined industry. An industry with a firm 
that controls 50 percent of the market and with 50 firms that each control 1 percent of the 
market, would have an HHI slightly above 0.25. In antitrust law, a merger that increases an 
industry’s HHI by 0.02 is considered anti-competitive.  The MHHI adds a delta to measure 293
both ownership distributions. Critics have noted that some drivers of the delta and prices are 
shared. For example, if industry-wide demand rises, capacity restraints of high market share 
firms could mean that other firms increase their market share of the expanding industry. This 
leads to a higher MHHI delta, but increased demand is also a reasonable explanation for higher 
prices.  
294
There have also been criticisms of the data used. The study covers the period from 2002 to 
2014. This was a tumultuous time for the airline industry, with at least eleven bankruptcies and 
five mergers.  Unfortunately, studying product market level effects is extremely difficult. There 295
is a reason why Schmalz et al. chose to look at the airlines industry. Airlines are rather unique, 
in that there are thousands of markets that have cross-sectional variance. Each route is 
basically a market.  If applied to say the beer industry, which shares airlines’ homogenous 296
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properties, one could draw a relationship between prices and common ownership levels. 
However, it ignores the fact that there might be economic or other reasons that explain why 
some firms are less commonly owned than others. The only other major studies on common 
ownership have been on generic drugs  and retail banking. 
297 298
The common ownership theory permeated through the financial press. However, it also 
reached the masses, being much more palpable and personal. Among other economics books, 
common ownership comes up in the 2020 book Death’s of Despair, the data-driven Hillbilly 
Elegy, written by economist Economist Anne Case and Nobel Prize winner Angus Deaton.  299
The topic has popped up in the BogleHeads forum. 
300
To contextualize common ownership, the studies have come at a time of rising concentrations 
of wealth and industry. Before 1980, wealth inequality was growing between the lower and 
middle class, attributable to the “college premium.”  After 1980, inequality between the lower 301
and middle classes continued, but the inequality between the middle and upper classes has 
risen sharply.  Perhaps not surprisingly, this has corresponded with a sharp increase in 302
industry concentration. Economists, such as Thomas Philippon, believes that concentration of 
power and ownership, too often achieved through regulations and lobbying, is the culprit for 
worsening conditions. It has resulted in growing profits but stagnant wages and lack of 
investment.  At the very least, the common ownership debate has attracted attention over its 303
potential welfare implications.
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However, along with the anomalies of the airline industry in the study’s years, these other 
trends complicate the analysis. Interestingly, income inequality, industry concentration, and 
common ownership trend together, since about 1980. Azar has shown that common ownership 
is correlated with lower wages (“monopsony’).  Philippon has shown that firms with higher 304
MHHIs invest less. Those excess funds tend to be allocated to stock buy backs. This trend 
began around 1990, was not significant until the 2000s, and took off after the 2008 financial 
crisis. This has occurred despite growing firm profitability. 
305
What is clear is that there is a very strong theoretical framework through which managers are 
less inclined to compete, due to cross-owning and passive funds. However, it is premature to 
say that that is how it plays out. Explicit collusion is ruled out. To what extent do managers pay 
attention to the other holdings of their shareholders? Though Vanguard owns just 9.41 percent 
of United Airlines, it is the airline’s largest shareholder. Does United Airlines consider that 
Vanguard owns 9.91 percent of Delta? 2.43 percent of United Airlines is owned by JETS, an 
ETF issued by U.S. Global Investors that is constructed exclusively of airline stocks.  United 306
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Airline’s second largest shareholder is PRIMECAP, which owns 3 to 10 percent of each of the 
six largest American airlines. 
307
It is very difficult to come to any conclusions. However, it would be a logical progression from 
these discussions to believe that due to their owners’ passive nature, whereby managers face 
too little monitoring, it would lessen their efforts to steal market share.

Index and mutual funds have no material incentive to either increase or decrease competition 
within an industry. In fact, José Azar, the researcher who initiated the empirical research on the 
topic of common ownership, has released a working paper that claims inter-industry effects of 
common ownership are monopolistic, but are actually outweighed by intra-industry common 
ownership. In other words, the set of firms that should be considered in a common ownership 
study should span multiple industries. He concludes the net effect of common ownership is 
actually reduced prices for airlines.  Not only does Vanguard own all the major airlines, but it 308
also owns Expedia and similar firms that rely on airline success for shareholder returns.

The theoretical frameworks are very logical. The empirical evidence shows that at least some 
effects occur directly related to common ownership. However, I believe there is a larger story 
taking place. To reconcile the contradictions and weak spots of the common ownership theory 
such as the lack of explicit collusion and the differences in inter and intra industry effects, there 
is Charlie Munger’s quote: “Show me the incentive, and I will show you the outcome.” As 
previously noted, these behemoths employ tiny teams to oversee stewardship. It is also 
doubtful that managers would consciously act on the diversified portfolios of their owners. 
Instead, this appears to be a continuation of the passive theme of index funds not holding 
managers accountable or even being deferential. Through this lens, it makes sense that the Big 
Three rarely engage with firms. Managers face low accountability to their major collective 
shareholders that are deferential to them. As a result, these loosened incentives soften 
competition.
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"The argument that common ownership could produce anti-competitive effects is certainly a 
plausible one.” 
—Burton Malkiel, author of “A Random Walk Down Wall Street” and 28-year board member of 
Vanguard  309
In the foreword of Bogle’s last book, Stay the Course: The Story of Vanguard and the Index 
Revolution, Burton Malkiel is oddly on the defensive. He spends more time addressing these 
recent concerns discussed here than extolling the story of himself, Bogle, Vanguard, and index 
funds. He admits that passive funds are “free-riders” and that the common ownership debate 
has merits. 
310
What are we to do about index funds? They’ve enabled the individual to invest in an affordable 
manner. However, they empower people like Larry Fink. They pose a threat to the proper 




Policy prescriptions to address the capital market or corporate governance distortions are 
necessarily radical. For example, a University of Chicago professor proposes treating passive 
funds like a derivatives holder, whereby voting shares would be illegal.  Posner argued that 311
the funds should be limited to owning no more than 1 percent in more than one firm in an 
industry. 
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Some have also considered break-ups of the index funds. An antimonopoly sentiment is 
growing in the American public. The academic leaders are calling themselves the “New 
Brandeis Movement,” named after classical liberal Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who 
coined the phrase “the curse of bigness.”  This sentiment is mostly directed at technology, 313
banks, tele-communications, and basically any super concentrated industry that is top of 
mind , which seems to exclude BlackRock and Vanguard. Today's economic situation—314
growing corporate profits, industry concentration, and stagnant wages—provides fertile ground 
for public support. Even Friedrich Hayek supported break-ups when necessary, quoting 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1938 speech calling for a break-up of the steel industry in the 
prologue of The Road To Serfdom.  But the political power and real benefits of low-cost 315
mutual funds precludes antitrust action. It is also necessary to consider if a set of dispersed 
passive funds that in aggregate are the same size as they were before would materially shift 
corporate influence to active investors.

There is some small hope in executive compensation changes, whereby incentives would be 
internalized. Renumeration packages that include relative performance compensation would 
strongly incentivize companies to compete. As it stands, stock options indexed against 
competitor stock or an industry index are essentially illegal. They are subject to prohibitive 
taxes since if they are in-the-money when granted, the authorities tax that difference 
immediately and also impose a 20 percent penalty.  Overturning that regulation, assuming it 316
is implemented, could help mitigate the common ownership concerns and stir meaningful R&D 
spending. Of course, benchmarks have flaws, so calibration would be necessary. 

Ultimately, however, there is still a principal-agents problem. Changing compensation 
packages could only mitigate, but not eliminate, the mismatch in incentives. Therefore, 
proposals of entirely “new” styles of corporate governance should be considered.
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“It is contagion that determines the fate of a theory in social science, not its validity.”  317
—Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan 
We are taught that capital markets are axiomatically there to aid in the allocation of capital. This 
a priori reasoning is used to suggest that there must always be active managers. Markets are 
as old as time, but public markets are somewhat new. The Buttonwood Agreement, signed on 
May 17, 1792, is the founding document of the New York Stock Exchange.  The S&P 500 did 318
not exist until March 4, 1957.  Markets have never been structured with half of the decision 319
makers not knowing what they are buying, which is where we find ourselves today.

“This is very much like the bubble in synthetic asset-backed CDOs before the Great Financial Crisis 
in that price-setting in that market was not done by fundamental security-level analysis, but by 
massive capital flows based on Nobel-approved models of risk that proved to be untrue.”  320
—Michael Burry, the man who shorted the market in 2008 and subject of The Big Short by Michael 
Lewis 
Since the retail index fund was invented in 1976, it took until 1990 for index funds to make up 6 
percent of Vanguard’s funds. They now account for more than 74 percent of Vanguard’s 
funds.  80 percent of inflows into 401(k)s are now target date funds. Vanguard controls 40 321
percent of the target date fund market.  IRAs and 401(k)s have seen minimal outflows, as the 322
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Baby Boomers who were the first to invest through them are still mostly below the age of 
required withdrawal. 

The 401(k) was introduced in 1978 and the IRA was introduced in 1974. A total of 47 years 
have passed since then. The twenty-something workers starting out at the advent of those 
retirement plans are now around 70 years old. For their entire lives, they have been contributing 
a portion of their paycheck every two weeks or so. As their contributions have increasingly 
gone to index funds, these have been non-discretionary purchases. In the history of the 401(k) 
and IRA, there have been no major outflows. December 2018 saw the largest withdrawals in 
history from the United States' equity market, as some Silent Generation who were transferred 
from defined benefit plans to defined contributions plans, as well as the oldest Boomers 
started withdrawing. With the passage of the SECURE Act, the required starting withdrawal 
age was extended from 70.5 to 72. Come 2022, much larger outflows will occur when a larger 
mass of Baby Boomers start withdrawing from their retirement plans.  The index funds have 323
never witnessed a seismic outflow, and what that means for the public market is frightening.
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“The directors of [public] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money 
than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.”  324
—Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
In Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ Modern Corporation and Private Property, they cite the 
worrisome “revolution” of the “separation of ownership from control.” Mutual fund providers 
are asset gathering machines, not fiduciaries. Using the cash-in-buy and cash-out-sell 
algorithm, indexes don’t consider fundamentals. With merely a few dozen staff for stewardship, 
these funds don’t hold managers accountable. Regulation cannot change the underlying 
incentives, and while index funds control the narrative and the government, regulation is not 
viable.

Therefore, structural changes in ownership regimes and corporate governance are required to 
solve the problem. Deriving insights from Christopher Alexander’s The Timeless Way of 
Building and the economist Elinor Ostrom’s political economy of the commons, Marjorie Kelly, 
who has dedicated her life to studying local wealth creation, weaves together many ideologies 
that have previously been presented as mutually exclusive: the proletariat owning the means of 
production, mutualism and collectivism, and anarcho-capitalism. Ultimately, Kelly provides a 
path to increasing one’s “skin in the game.” This is a good place to start in addressing the 
issues with passive investors.

In her book, Owning Our Future, Kelly examines small grassroots movements that redefine 
ownership. For example, while most companies will try to minimize what they pay to their 
suppliers, the opposite is true at Organic Valley, a company that posted $1.1 billion in sales last 
year.  That’s because the suppliers own the company. They issue only preferred stock to 325
outside investors. Many other forms of ownership exist, such as a New Hampshire trailer park 
that pooled their assets to buy the land they lived on when facing eviction. SC Johnson is 
founder owned. Minwind, a Minnesota wind farm, is community owned. Kelly also writes about 
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the John Lewis Partnership in the United Kingdom, that is employee owned. While visiting, 
Kelly picked out a salesman who wore a bow-tie to work, a manifestation of the knowledge 
that his actions in the corporate setting directly impact his well-being. The principal and agent 
have been merged.

“You could trace the biggest financial crisis in the history of the world back to [the decision of John 
Gutfreund to turn] Salomon Brothers from a private partnership into Wall Street’s first public 
corporation.”  326
—Michael Lewis, The Big Short 
When the 2008 financial crisis occurred, community banks and credit unions fared better than 
their too-big-to-fail counterparts. For example, a North Carolina bank called Self-Help Credit 
Union was a member-owned credit union. Over 15 years, it had processed close to $6 billion in 
mortgage loans to underserved communities, the same subprime borrowers that constituted 
the “equity” tranche in mortgage-back collateralized debt obligations (or in the synthetic CDO, 
the credit default swap). While lawyers and bankers had no clue what they were buying, they 
saw their banks collapse. By contrast, Self-Help, like most of the 8,000 consumer owned credit 
unions in the United States, required no bailouts whatsoever. Community banks were the only 
sector of the banking industry to show growth in lending in the early post-crash period. Many 
of these lenders didn’t quickly sell off the mortgages like a hot potato, but kept them on their 
balance sheets. They had skin in the game. The bank Kelly uses, Beverly Cooperative Bank, 
had just ten foreclosures during the period of the crisis. Unfortunately, regulators slapped 
burdensome capital requirements on them and sent auditors after them. Moving forward, it 
might serve us well to remember the Bailey Building and Loan mutual bank from It’s A Beautiful 
Life. 
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“Most fundamental of all, the position of ownership has changed from that of an active to that of 
a passive agent. In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could exercise direction 
and for which he was responsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper representing a set of rights 
and expectations with respect to an enterprise. But over the enterprise and over the physical 
property—the instruments of production—in which he has an interest, the owner has little control. 
At the same time he bears no responsibility with respect to the enterprise or its physical property. It 
has often been said that the owner of a horse is responsible. If the horse lives he must feed it. If the 
horse dies he must bury it. No such responsibility attaches to a share of stock. The owner is 
practically powerless through his own efforts to affect the underlying property.”  328
—Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
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